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Despite South Africa’s middle-income status, half its citizens lack 
adequate nutrition, water, energy, shelter, healthcare and education. In order 
to address this ‘dismal shame of poverty’ (Mbeki, 1996) the new constitution 
requires that local authorities ‘give priority to the basic needs of… and 
promote the social and economic development of the community’. The 
challenges municipalities face – segregation, institutional weakness, service 
backlogs and lack of finance – are to be overcome,   according to the Local 
Government White Paper (RSA, 1998a) by establishing ‘Developmental Local 
Government’, which will ‘work together with local communities to find 
sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives’.  
This chapter considers the prospects for developmental local 
government to play a leading role in reducing poverty. The first section 
outlines the context in which South Africa’s post-apartheid local government 
system is evolving. The second sets out some of the central elements of the 
municipal policy developed during the mid-1990s and crystallised in the 1998 
Local Government White Paper. It presents an analysis, developed at the 
time of the white papers’ launch,1 of the progressive potential in this policy to 
address the apartheid legacy of poverty and inequality. The analysis reveals 
certain contradictions and limitations. The final section locates the limitations 
within a broader theoretical context, and suggest that the contradictions result 
from the assimilation in the white paper of several conflicting approaches 
rooted in the South African liberation struggle and transition. It concludes 
that a pro-poor orientation in the local state is likely to require political 




In order to assess municipal policies in more detail it is important to 
bring to mind the context in which they operate. Ten key aspects are detailed 
below. 
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1.  A history of discrimination. Apartheid municipalities played a critical role in 
enforcing segregation and dispossessing and impoverishing the black masses. 
Forced removals, land expropriation, discriminatory housing, restrictions on 
trade and racist employment practices helped to create a black majority with 
few assets, located on poor land far from jobs (Parnell, 1998). Black local 
authorities, often puppets of apartheid, were a target of organised resistance. 
Negotiated ward boundaries still grant whites excess influence.  
2.  Worsening poverty and inequality. South Africa’s is the world’s second most 
unequal nation, with half the population living in poverty on just 11% of 
national income. This leads to stunting in a quarter of children (May, 1998). 
Rural and female-headed households are the poorest and their situation 
appears to be deteriorating. Between 1990-4 the infant mortality rate amongst 
Africans rose from 48 to 54 per thousand, whilst that for whites fell from 7.4 
to 7.3. In national poverty hearings the South African NGO Coalition found 
that life is getting harder for many of the rural poor. 
3.  Geographic segregation. South African settlements are deeply divided, often 
with a physical ‘buffer zone’ between racial and economic groups. Whereas 
townships and rural areas have weak tax bases, white suburbs generate 
substantial revenue through commercial property rates. Since workers’ 
commuting from townships do not benefit from these commercial rates this 
produces a cross-subsidy in favour of affluent areas. 
4.  Rising unemployment. South Africa’s unemployment rate of 34% (RSA, 
1999b) is one of the highest in the world. Employment in mining and 
manufacturing has declined for over a decade, with the gradual withdrawal of 
the state from the economy under the National Party in the late 1980s and 
the adoption of free-trade and free-market principles,  crystallised in the ANC 
government’s Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic 
strategy. Private sector employment is now shrinking at around 2.5% per 
annum (NIEP, 1999), pushing up urban joblessness, holding down wage levels, 
and generating a knock-on effect in the former homelands, where rural 
unemployment is around 50%. 
5.  Service backlogs. A fifth of urban households in South Africa have no 
electricity, a quarter have no running water, a third make do without a flush 
toilet, and over half have no telephone (RSA, 1997a). Four fifths of rural 
households have none of these services. The capital cost of providing an 
‘acceptable’ service to everyone (defined by national government as an 
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outdoor tap, flush toilet and electric power in urban areas, and a communal 
standpipe and pit latrine in most rural areas) is 5.3% of the national budget 
(after interest payments) for ten years. This is twice the amount allocated by 
government (RSA, 1998b: 12-20). 
6.  Persistent non-payment. Despite a campaign stressing the link between rights 
and responsibilities (entitled Masakhane or Let’s Build Together) and a swathe of 
service disconnections and court cases, millions of residents still refuse to 
pay. The national rate of default was 23% in 1997, rising above 90% in some 
townships (Mathiane, 1997). The total amount owed increased from 26% to 
33% of rates and service charges between 1997-8  (Kapp, 1998). Whilst 
millions had their services cut, reconnection rates for electricity fell to 47%, 
suggesting that many households can’t afford basic services.2 
7.  Popular dissatisfaction. Four people were killed in 1997 in rates riots in El 
Dorado Park, Johannesburg’s largest ‘coloured’ township; protests shook 
East Rand and Pretoria townships, Secunda in Mpumalanga, and the Transkei 
town of Butterworth (where after three days a resident was shot dead before 
crowds dispersed); in KwaThema, east of Johannesburg, three councillors’ 
homes were burned down; and in Tembisa, residents destroyed thousands of 
pre-payment electricity meters. In 1998 mass water cut-offs in Amersfoort, 
Mpumalanga caused infant deaths from diarrhoea, leading to a councillor’s 
kidnapping; in Tsakane on the East Rand 3 000 non-payers stoned police to 
prevent seizure of their goods. In 1999 Mount Ayliff residents occupied their 
new municipal headquarters to protest disconnections. And in February 2000, 
Durban councillors staunchly defended the use of teargas and live 
ammunition against tenants resisting evictions for disputed rent arrears. 
(Mvoko, 1997, D. Fine, 1998, Yoganathan, 2000). Other incidents go 
unreported.  
8.  A financial crisis. Over half of municipalities are thought to be in financial 
difficulty. In 77 councils – one fifth of those who responded to an official 
survey – there is insufficient cash and investments in reserve to meet a single 
month’s wage bill (Kapp, 1998: 11). National subsidies for municipal 
infrastructure have been cut3 and central government has declared its 
unwillingness to bail out bankrupt authorities. In response to this uncertain 
financial position – and contributing to its deterioration – private lending has 
more or less dried up, except for short-term overdrafts and a few high-
interest loans.4  
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9. Pressure from business. Despite the white paper’s emphasis on 
competitiveness and a warning to municipalities not to ‘unduly burden local 
business through higher tariffs’ (RSA, 1998a), one business commentator 
reflected a common feeling when she wrote: ‘The white paper’s declaration 
that “provision of basic household infrastructure is the central contribution 
made by local government to social and economic development” is worrying. 
This neglects economic development… and potentially commits local 
government to a non-sustainable needs-driven approach’ (Bernstein, 1998).  
10.  Restructuring. Hastily drawn municipal borders and negotiated ward 
boundaries produced a fragmented system, with metropolitan areas divided 
into impractical sub-structures, and some small towns and rural areas cut up 
like a patchwork quilt. A re-demarcation process aims to rationalise the 
system (creating strong unified metropolitan authorities, for example) and to 
ensure that municipal elections in 2000 are more representative. But 
institutional change has lead to periods of paralysis in the past. The 
forthcoming rationalisation, moreover, if taken too far – and current plans 
cut 843 councils to 235 – may negatively impact local democracy. 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POVERTY 
 
Four developmental approaches for local government are contained 
in the white paper: integrated development planning, service delivery, local 
economic development and democratisation. These are outlined below, along 
with analysis of their pro-poor potential and limitations. 
 
Integrated development planning 
The rationale for introducing a new planning system is illustrated by 
this account of municipal development during the 1990s in the Eastern Cape 
town of Stutterheim:5 
This small, traditionally white market town is set in an impoverished 
hinterland. Fifty thousand Africans live in eight townships and villages, only 
one of which is formally incorporated into the municipality. Segregation is 
alive and well with new low-income housing on the outer edge of the 
townships now justified by town plans in terms of preserving  the ‘residential 
character’ of the town, and ensuring that ‘high-densities’ do not cause 
‘depreciation of adjoining properties’. A private firm provides water in white 
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and coloured areas, whilst the seven excluded townships and villages are 
almost entirely unreticulated. In the incorporated township, which is only 
partially served, unemployment is 50% and two-thirds of households 
(declared ‘indigent’) receive remissions on their municipal bills. Consumption 
by those receiving free water has doubled (partly due to illegal connections). 
By 1997 the municipality carried chronic deficits and an inherited provincial 
loan of R3m was long in arrears. Blaming non-payment in the township, the 
council cut off water to nearly 20% of residents, of which only 6% were 
reconnected. Capital spending declined in 1998, with virtually no 
transformation of the budget. Aside from public works, the single biggest 
deficit item was salaries for parks, gardens and sports fields, located close to 
wealthy areas. Residents in the excluded townships and villages are denied 
access to municipal amenities or charged an extra fee for their use. 
This picture is disturbingly familiar. Even in metropolitan areas, 
apartheid has been replaced by economic segregation and attempts to 
integrate rich and poor neighbourhoods have been met with 
incomprehension or opposition by property owners and developers. Budgets 
reflect marginal yearly changes and council personnel are still allocated 
disproportionately to affluent areas. New councillors have found it difficult to 
negotiate the complex institutional obstacles to redistribution and integration, 
or to refute technical justifications for segregation and privilege in town 
plans, budgets and by-laws. Progressives have been outmanoeuvred in the 
lop-sided political power-sharing system by seasoned white councillors and 
officials.  
There are a few examples of restructured budgets, desegregated town 
plans6 and reformed administrations. However the failure rate was sufficient 
to prompt national action.  
Councils are now required (RSA, 1996c) to produce Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs), with spatial, institutional and financial 
components, including a needs assessment, prioritisation exercise, 
implementation programmes, and monitoring systems. With the participation 
of poor communities, IDPs should ‘help municipalities to develop a holistic 
strategy for poverty alleviation’ (RSA, 1998a: 27). Plans must ensure 
‘integrated development…with homes and jobs close together…better use of 
existing infrastructure…and correction of the historically distorted spatial 
patterns’ (RSA, 1995). 
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In the above town, an IDP which mobilises the poor might establish 
political support for redistribution. The excluded townships and villages 
would be incorporated into the municipality. Service backlogs, once 
quantified, would be publicly prioritised. A spatial plan would integrate town 
and townships through housing, transport and commercial development in 
the buffer zone. Tariffs would be designed to achieve redistribution from 
luxury to lower household consumption, universal access, financial 
sustainability, and social goals (such as health improvements). The plan might 
address ‘environmental justice’ (Harvey, 1998) – conserving natural resources 
for future generations whilst ensuring access to a liveable environment. In 
mixed-income residential developments the council might seek more public 
open spaces, greenery, light, fresh air, and sufficient physical spacing to 
prevent the spread of fires and epidemics, plus a commitment to affordable 
public transport.  
This kind of plan (of which there are partial examples elsewhere7) 
would make it harder to perpetuate old expenditure patterns. In reality IDPs 
might become technocratic processes aimed at rubber-stamping existing 
priorities or over-ambitious blueprints with no plan to mobilise the resources 
and (national, provincial, community) support to implement them. Avoiding 
these pitfalls will require high calibre leaders, committed to redressing 
inequality, empowering low-income citizens, women and other marginalised 
groups. These groups will have to be central to developing IDPs, which must be 
dynamic instruments at the centre of a cycle of consultation, planning, 
budgeting and public feedback. Central and provincial governments support 
will be crucial to ensure that municipalities have the resources, powers and 
capacity to implement IDPs. 
 
Service Delivery 
According to the constitution, ‘[e]veryone has the right to… adequate 
housing… healthcare… food and water… social security… [and] to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well being… The state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.’ The 
white paper contains a similar endorsement of public investment in 
infrastructure: ‘Basic services enhance the quality of life of citizens, and 
increase their social and economic opportunities by promoting health and 
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safety, facilitating access (to work, to education, to recreation) and stimulating 
new productive activities’ (RSA, 1998a: 92). 
The finance section of the white paper takes a more restrictive view. 
People are only to receive services which they can afford. They must pay the 
full cost, in direct proportion to the amount they consume. ‘Non-economic’ 
price distortions should be kept to a minimum. Whilst capital and operating 
subsidies are to be provided to the indigent, these should not encourage a 
‘culture of entitlement’. Subsidies should be funded primarily from national 
taxes, and subsidy levels should be set by the Minister of Finance after due 
consideration of the constitution and government’s fiscal targets and 
priorities. Local businesses and affluent high-volume consumers should not 
be unduly burdened with cross-subsidies, which might make the local area 
uncompetitive. Each service must be ‘financially sustainable’, defined as an 
arrangement ‘likely to ensure (i) a reasonable surplus, in the case of a service 
performed by a municipality itself; or (ii) a reasonable profit, in the case of a 
service performed by a service provider other than the municipality itself’ 
(RSA, 1999a: 3).  
This treatment of household services as ‘private goods’, to be sold 
according to commercial principles tends to underestimate their contribution 
to health, welfare, educational achievement and social stability, and the 
economic returns which this generates (freeing the time and energy of rural 
women, for instance). These broader benefits and ‘economic multipliers’ lead 
the World Bank to declare that ‘infrastructure represents, if not the engine, 
then the “wheels” of economic activity’ (World Bank, 1994). South African 
municipal policy is surprisingly sceptical of infrastructure multipliers, arguing 
that beyond a public health minimum (i.e. a communal standpipe and latrine) 
they are difficult to quantify (RSA, 1997a).  
The private goods approach also reduces citizens to individual 
consumers with income streams and preferences. Yet apartheid operated against 
whole communities and resistance was a collective effort. Many South 
Africans have come to view quality of life as a matter for whole communities, 
not a question of individual preference and wealth. The hard line on 
individual cost recovery is driving a wedge between local government and 
poor communities. Protests by the latter reflect a view that rates and tariffs 
(even if set by the market) are unaffordable and unjust, in light of South 
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Africa’s discriminatory history and in relation to the poor quality of services 
provided.  
Emphasis on ‘economic pricing’ and local competitiveness limits the 
potential for redistribution between communities, and within sectors such as 
water and electricity. In South Africa such cross-subsidisation often takes 
place at the expense of poor households.8 The reluctance to correct this and, 
moreover, to subsidise the poor for fear of harming competitiveness, ignores 
the detrimental impact of poverty on all households and firms (through ill-
health, crime, pollution, social unrest etc.) and hence on local growth 
prospects. 
Since half of South Africans are poor it may make sense to subsidise low 
consumption across the board. ‘Lifeline’ amounts of water and electricity might be provided 
free with higher prices for luxury consumption. This system, which manages demand by 
penalising waste, appears to be working well in one or two South African municipalities. 
Such subsidies require strong political backing to drive home that crime-ridden slums are 
bad for everyone, an argument which enabled Johannesburg councillors to win a court case 
against affluent Sandton ratepayers (Cashdan, 1997: 9). 
Market pricing and profitability set the stage for privatisation, which 
is promoted in South Africa in the form of ‘public-private partnerships’. 
Injections of capital and expertise plus efficiency gains are benefits often 
associated with this approach. But in the context of high inequality, 
privatisation is susceptible to ‘cherry-picking’ of affluent areas. In addition, it 
has proven quite difficult for municipalities to regulate private providers so as 
to ensure sustained improvements in access, quality and efficiency (Martin, 
1993). South African municipalities are in an especially weak position vis-à-vis 
large multinationals (Kotze et al, 1999). Where efficiency gains by the latter 
are made at the expense of municipal wages or jobs, the net effect on poverty 
is indeterminate.  
Pressure to privatise is increased by the view that government is inefficient and 
unreliable. The South African Infrastructure Finance Corporation charges an interest 
premium to compensate its shareholders for the extra risk of municipal lending. Faced with 
a choice between paying such premiums or guaranteeing even higher returns to private 
operators,9 municipalities have an incentive to prove market prejudices wrong by improving 
their own service delivery. 
Improvements in public service provision can provide some of the 
benefits sought through privatisation whilst avoiding the cost premiums. 
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Services may be improved by introducing more democratic public 
management approaches, which draw on the knowledge of public service 
workers (Albo, 1993), through partnerships between public agencies, and by 
means of public-community partnerships. Examples of the benefits of all 
these approaches exist both in South Africa10 and internationally (Martin, 
2000). 
Use of municipal services as an anti-poverty strategy – by maximising 
the social benefits and economic returns associated with treating these 
services as ‘public goods’11 and taking seriously the difficulty of regulating 
private utilities – requires a long-term vision both locally and nationally. 
Locally, a focus on short-term returns and affordability may lead 
councils to provide low-grade infrastructure, extending segregated slums 
which cost more to upgrade later, and which deepen dissatisfaction.12 Up 
front improvements in services – through efficiency gains, cross-
subsidisation, creative financing, and building on existing infrastructure – 
might help break the downward spiral of an unreformed budget, non 
payment, cutbacks, disconnections, dissatisfaction and financial deterioration. 
Despondency in municipal financial circles makes it difficult to suggest that 
investing in better public services  may be part of the solution. Changing  
perceptions is probably key to the solution. If one or two municipalities can 
succeed, others will follow. 
Nationally, a long term focus on the social and economic benefits of 
services might lead to a reconsideration of cuts in subsidies, and to an 
avoidance of policies which put undue pressure on municipalities to 
privatise.13 Subsidised loans or grants (either from public funds or mobilised 
from private sources such as pension funds) might be applied to public sector 
solutions. More creative use (and expansion) of the housing subsidy – stagnant 
for 5 years and modelled along Western suburban nuclear-family ownership – 
could unlock grassroots energies, enhance kinship mutual aid systems, and 
establish community and household designs more suited to the needs of 
women.14 A rethink might be required of the indigence subsidy, which signals 
that poverty can be addressed through a special programme, rather than via a 
review of all municipal priorities, finances and operations. This downplays the 
scale of the problem, especially given the restrictive formula used to target the 
subsidy,15 and centralises the redistributive mechanism in the Department of 
Finance, where it is it susceptible to cutbacks. 
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Local Economic Development (Led) 
The white paper emphasises local competitiveness and advocates 
municipal ‘marketing and investment support’. A proposal from business 
suggests boosting competitiveness by improving the ‘residential environment 
for the managers who run businesses’, especially the ‘quality of life and safety 
and personal security of expatriate executives’ in middle class suburbs (CDE, 
1998). These arguments and much of the literature on local economic 
development in South Africa (Rogerson, 1997, NBI, 1998) is underpinned by 
a view that globalisation heightens competition between localities for 
investment and export markets. If South African municipalities can ‘win’ this 
competition, everybody will benefit, especially the impoverished majority. 
This view has become so commonplace that a 1997 LED road show was 
entitled simply ‘we can do it’.  
A reconsideration of the impact of globalisation on South African 
localities and analysis of appropriate pro-poor responses is overdue. Changes 
in the organisation and geography of capitalism16 associated with the crisis of 
profitability and growth in core industrial countries since the 1970s have been 
felt everywhere. Large financiers and other corporations increasingly preside 
over global networks (Harrison, 1997), relocating and restructuring their 
operations rapidly to boost and sustain profits by, for instance, speculating on 
currencies or searching out new low-wage sites for manufacturing and data 
processing and high-quality locations in ‘world cities’ for command and 
control functions. This has given rise to new (and constantly changing) 
patterns of uneven development (Smith, 1984). 
For peripheral or semi-peripheral nations the short-term and 
speculative character of most capital flows can have disastrous effects, as 
demonstrated in the Asian crisis of 1998. Longer-term fixed investment is 
mostly targeted within (or to a lesser extent between) each of the ‘triad’ 
regions of Western Europe, North America and East Asia (Africa receives a 
tiny proportion). Core nations in these regions defend the interests of their 
home-based corporations (against competition and social, environmental or 
labour regulation) via new forms of protectionism and the management of 
trade and investment.17  
In South Africa much inward investment has been short-term and 
speculative; sixty per cent of the remainder has been in the form of takeovers 
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or privatisation (NIEP, 1999). Large-scale South African capital has beaten a 
path out of the country, as financial liberalisation has permitted offshore 
operations and overseas listings. Competitiveness in the core economic 
sectors of mining, minerals and energy (and associated manufacturing) has 
been achieved at the expense of employment. In 1996-7 over 100 000 
manufacturing jobs were lost despite relatively good output growth, and 
improvements in productivity (IDC, 1998). Over the ANC government’s first 
five year term in office, more than half a million jobs were lost (NIEP, 1999). 
When investors quit emerging markets in 1998 the rand plummeted and 
South Africa dipped into recession.18 
Globalisation in its present form, then, appears to contain an empty 
promise for the impoverished African masses. Worse, it may function as a 
discourse which encourages governments to adopt policies (such as financial 
liberalisation and cuts in corporate taxation and social service spending) 
which benefit international finance at the expense of the poor. The tendency 
of globalisation (or, its central policy thrust, global neo-liberalism) to 
exacerbate uneven development on a world scale is now acknowledged by 
some of its erstwhile advocates (Soros, 1998, World Bank, 1999). A 
discussion document presented to the ANC Alliance declared, ‘the paradigm 
of an endlessly expanding global freeway, in which, to benefit, individual (and 
particularly developing) economies simply had to take the standard 
macroeconomic on-ramp (liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, flexibility 
and a 3 per cent budget deficit) is now in crisis’ (ANC Alliance, 1998). 
Uneven development is not restricted to the global or national scale. 
Inter-local competition deepens intra-local inequalities (Peterson, 1981), and 
globalisation may hasten a ‘race to the bottom’ in which competing 
municipalities bargain away living standards for the poor in an effort to create 
an investment-friendly environment (Harvey, 1989, Peck & Tickell, 1994). In 
1997 three South African municipalities jostled to offer up to R20m in cheap 
land and services to a Korean car manufacturer, whose planned investment 
was shelved during the Asian crisis (Dludlu, 1997, Mutikani, 1998). Such 
‘corporate welfare’ has been bitterly criticised in the United States by 
communities (CCC, 1996) and, lately, the mainstream media (Bartlett & 
Steele, 1998) for diverting public money from health and education to tax 
breaks for shareholders. 
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Municipal LED in South Africa does not rely exclusively on 
competition for investment. Many retrenched workers have resorted to 
informal sector survival strategies and some LED initiatives aim to support 
these, and to assist the establishment of small and micro enterprises. Support 
for the informal sector may be a more promising pro-poor approach to LED 
than investment incentives for large firms, although South Africa’s small 
business support programmes have made little progress (partly due to a 
reliance on conservative private lenders), and doubts have been raised 
internationally about the impact of small business support on unemployment 
and, hence, poverty (Storey, 1997, Harrison, 1997). 
The South African literature contains some more explicitly 
redistributive LED approaches. The ANC’s 1994 election manifesto, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), advocated government 
subsidies for worker and community-controlled enterprises. The South 
African National Civic Organisation has called for the establishment of 
municipal LED units to perform a range of functions, including worker 
training (SANCO, 1996). In practice many LED initiatives have confused 
aims, and lack an explicit link with poverty reduction (Isandla, 1998). Aid 
agencies and policy makers promote their favourite international cases, such 
as the U.S. city of Baltimore, where tax breaks have transformed the 
downtown but left deep poverty in black neighbourhoods, Jakarta, where low 
wages have attracted millions of sweatshop jobs for peasants, Curitiba in 
Brazil, an environmentally efficient city after thirty years of municipal 
transport planning and investment, or Kerala, South India, where attention is 
concentrated on health and education.  
I have classified international LED approaches under five headings 
(Cashdan, 1997: 24): traditional (industrial recruitment); urban efficiency 
(boosting productivity by lowering costs); entrepreneurial (targeting growing 
sectors); progressive-competitive (targeting industries based on social benefits), 
progressive and community-based (linking profitability to redress) and radical 
redistributive (intervening directly to equalise wealth). My analysis, based partly 
on South Africa’s experience of inequitable and jobless growth, leads me to 
be sceptical of approaches which focus exclusively on efficiency or 
competitiveness, in the hope that employment and tax revenues will benefit 
the poor. South African municipalities might be well advised to ‘bet on the 
basics’. Evidence suggests that provision of good quality infrastructure and 
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amenities to all residents is probably the key contribution a municipality can 
make to pro-poor economic development (Cashdan, 1998b). Community-
based and progressive approaches which link profitability to redress might 
also be explored (Cashdan, 1997: 33-43). Linkage policies, for instance, 
channel profit from commercial development directly to poor areas. 
Community-based public works programmes create infrastructure whilst 
providing income, job experience and training. Redistributive procurement 
policies ensure that when local authorities buy goods and services they help 
to create a more equitable local economy. In rural areas access to land – as 
well as skills and credit for small farmers – is a pre-requisite for pro-poor 
LED. 
Perhaps the vision for local economic development in South Africa 
should be home-grown: an African alternative based on the cultural and 
political heritage of the country, the survival strategies of the poor over many 
decades, and the tradition of community organisation and mobilisation.19 
 
Democratisation 
The white paper mandates active participation by citizens in four 
senses: as voters, to maximise accountability of politicians; as citizens who 
express their views via associations; as consumers, who expect value-for-money; 
and as organised partners involved in the mobilisation of resources (RSA, 1998a: 
33). 
In practice, one of these identities may squeeze out the others. 
Consumers subject to harsh credit control, even when they are unable to pay, 
are discouraged from participating as active citizens or voters in the 
democratic process. Privatisation can deepen their alienation, as people find 
that elected leaders don’t control essential services. The white paper 
recommends ‘civic education programmes about the importance of voting’. 
But countries like the U.K. and U.S. have found it very difficult to reverse 
falling turnouts in local elections. This has led Britain’s Labour government 
to launch a ‘democratic renewal’ initiative to rethink and rebuild the 
relationship between citizens and the local state.20 
Whilst this kind of rethink may already be necessary in South Africa, 
this country has a recent history of community organisation and mobilisation 
to draw upon. Community based organisations and trade unions spearheaded 
the resistance against municipal apartheid; stokvels (or credit unions) have for 
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decades helped people to save and survive financially against the odds; more 
recently, development committees and trusts sprang up to implement the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme. The RDP document states: 
‘These social movements and CBOs are a major asset in the effort to 
democratise and develop our society… To play their full role, these 
formations will require capacity-building assistance’ (ANC, 1994, sec. 5). 
South Africa’s social movements suffered a setback in the early 1990s. 
A national capacity building programme never got off the drawing board. The 
Local Government Transition Act drew grassroots leaders into lengthy power-
sharing negotiations, weighted in favour of white councillors. Many of these 
leaders entered interim municipal structures, which lacked the political will and 
resources to take far-reaching decisions, and left grassroots groups leaderless 
and frustrated. Communities were encouraged to set up ‘reconstruction and 
development committees’ to identify local needs, but little funding was 
forthcoming and conflicts arose in some areas between these committees and 
local government. 
Demobilisation and confusion in community organisations, the 
inheritance of municipal staff, structures and ordinances from the previous 
regime, and the recent emphasis on individual cost-recovery, has given rise to 
a local state system which often has an uneasy relationship with poor 
communities. However, as enlightened councillors and officials explore this 
area, there is potential for local authorities to work to empower pro-poor civil 
society, and to work closely with community groups to plan, restructure and 
deliver services. Positive initiatives include provision of premises, finance, 
training and information to community groups, participatory planning and 
budgeting processes, and conflict resolution in support of marginalized, 
people such as controls to prevent landlords raising rents excessively. 
The longer term challenge is to strengthen the local democratic 
culture, such that government actively encourages a more participative form 
of democracy, even where this exposes local divisions. The present political 
system lacks local accountability. Parties are not required to produce local 
manifestos and it is national party loyalties which count in local elections. 
Local divisions are suppressed. Candidates and parties might boost local 
accountability by presenting plans to the electorate before the elections and 
linking them to the Integrated Development Plans to be implemented once 
they are in office.  
 









In the sections above I have made a few suggestions as to how 
present policies might be adapted and implemented in order to maximise 
their impact on poverty. Below I highlight some theoretical issues which I 
believe require further thought if pro-poor local government is to become a 
reality. These theoretical issues might be used to inform future case studies of 
the implementation of South Africa’s new municipal policy. 
 
Municipal Developmentalism 
Each aspect of developmental local government in the white paper 
has a distinct history in South Africa. Strong metropolitan government marks 
the fulfilment of the United Democratic Front’s 1980s demand for ‘One City 
One Tax Base’. Integrated development planning, with its emphasis on 
consulting organisations in poor communities, echoes the ‘people-centred 
development’ championed by civic organisations in the early 1990s and 
crystallised in the RDP. Economic pricing and profit-making in service 
delivery, by contrast, can be traced to the faith placed from the mid-1990s in 
the efficiency and growth which market-friendly and neo-liberal economic 
policies are to generate. 
No advice is given in the white paper about how municipalities 
should deal with the contradictions which are bound to emerge from a set of 
policies with such diverse roots. What if poor communities ask integrated 
development planners to run their services at a loss for ten years as an 
investment in human capital? Or if large industries, made more globally 
competitive by shedding workers and suppressing wages, demand the 
removal of informal traders eking out a living on the streets? The white paper 
steers clear of these contradictions by relying on an implicit developmental 
logic, which runs something like this: Poverty is a condition which resulted 
from past policies. It can be addressed through the actions of local 
government, primarily those aimed at increasing responsiveness and 
efficiency, and especially through partnerships with civil society. The result will 
be development, an improved state of affairs, beneficial to all. A municipality 
which takes the required actions is, by definition, developmental.  
 




Background Research Series                                                                      Municipal Services Project 
16 
The logic of municipal developmentalism21 is powerful and attractive 
because it offers everyone a stake and a solution within reach. Its definition 
of the problem diverts attention from contradictions and conflicts and 
sidesteps many troublesome questions. Who are the poor? Have the 
processes which generate poverty really been left behind? What is the 
relationship of the state to these processes and what kind of local state can 
halt or reverse them? Who exactly has an interest, either in the short or long 
term, in creating a state which is able to transform society so fundamentally? 
Whilst government policy documents may not be an appropriate forum to 
address such questions, future research will have to. Below are a few initial 
comments. 
 
On Poverty Creation 
After two decades in which growth-oriented structural adjustment 
and palliative projects aimed at the poor have failed to reduce the number of 
people globally living in poverty (World Bank, 1999), mainstream 
development agencies have begun to embrace broader definitions of poverty. 
They have also had to confront the historical processes and contemporary 
political imbalances which perpetuate inequality. Hence avoidance of poverty 
and vulnerability requires ownership and effective management of a ‘portfolio 
of assets’, including labour power, monetary wealth, land and property, 
education and health, social support networks, and access to decision making 
power within households and communities (Moser, 1998, May, 1998). 
Poverty strategies, then, cannot be limited to growth-enhancing macro-
management, nor can they shy away from the redistribution of wealth. ‘Initial 
levels of inequality in assets (land and education) also determine the poverty 
impact of growth, as do gender and ethnic inequalities. Addressing these 
structural inequalities thus become a crucial component of a poverty 
reduction strategy’ (World Bank, 2000). 
Whilst municipal developmentalism acknowledges the unequal 
distribution of these assets in South Africa, it falls into a trap identified by 
Fine & Rustomjee (1996: 5) in which ‘the entrenched inheritance and 
structures of apartheid, in income and wealth, infrastructure, health, 
education and welfare and employment, etc. are now perceived as problems 
rather than the continuing basis on which society functions irrespective of political 
democratisation’ (my emphasis). Poverty and inequality in South Africa, 
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according to Fine & Rustomjee, can only be understood in relation to the 
characteristics (labour requirements, investment patterns, state subsidy 
priorities etc.) of the ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ (MEC) – a  peculiarly South 
African collaboration between very large mining, energy and finance 
conglomerates and the state – which constitutes the core of the economy. In 
relation to the MEC, the poor are the miners who extracted ore under 
apartheid and continue to do so today, domestic workers still living in the 
servants’ quarters of wealthy households, surplus workers (in former 
homelands, on the urban fringe and migrants from neighbouring countries) 
whose unemployment keeps down labour costs, rural households, whose 
agriculture barely at subsistence levels subsidises the reproduction of the 
labour force, and many others who occupied similar positions in relation to 
the MEC under apartheid as they do today. To the extent that the MEC 
(whose resilience depends on concentrated ownership of assets and finance) 
continues to be the mainstay of the economy, South Africa’s class structure 
and income distribution is unlikely to change a great deal. Deracialisation will 
also be limited to the creation of a small black elite. 
This casts a shadow over ‘job creation’ as the core of a poverty 
strategy in an economic structure which relies on poverty wages, or the cheap 
reproduction of labour power within impoverished former homelands. But 
what alternatives are there? According to Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 252), the 
key lies in a ‘state programme of public expenditure in social and economic 
infrastructure’ to meet basic needs. By implication, a reorientation of 
economic activity is also required, away from large-scale capital-intensive 
state-sponsored export projects towards a more decentralised, broadly 
owned, and diverse economy attuned to meeting basic needs. 
 
On The Limits Of The Local State 
What is the connection between the state and the inequality which 
characterises the MEC? Municipal developmentalism treats the state as set of 
neutral and more or less autonomous instruments or institutions, whose 
impact can be altered with the introduction of new policies and/or 
organisational structures. Marxist state theorists, by contrast, have focused on 
the internalisation of dominant social and economic relations within the state, 
and its role in reproducing them (see Lemon in this volume). Jessop (1990: 
45) characterises the state as a ‘system of domination’ and state power as ‘a 
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complex, contradictory effect of class (and popular-democratic) struggles, 
mediated through and conditioned by the institutional system of the state’. To 
the extent that the South African state is now more attentive to poverty, then, 
this results from changes in the balance of forces between social groups and 
classes (business and labour, finance and production, urban and rural 
interests, large-scale capital and smaller enterprises and so on) associated with 
mass participation in the liberation struggle. The resurgence of vested 
interests – apartheid and homeland officials, financial and corporate interests 
(including a small black elite), large landowners etc. – during the negotiated 
transition curtailed the transformation of the state. 
Local state power similarly reflects a local balance of forces, but this is 
severely (and perhaps increasingly) constrained: ‘The dislocation between 
representative institutions and political decisions, between the spheres in 
which people participate and the spheres in which decisions are made which 
determine living conditions for those same people, expands with the advance 
of processes of globalisation’ (Vilas, 1997: 20). As economic policy at national 
and global scales defers to corporate/financial interests and displaces 
governance into unaccountable bodies (privatised utilities, global financial 
institutions etc), the power of the local state is circumscribed and the space 
for local democratic participation is restricted.  
Decentralisation of functions (often with inadequate funding) may 
enable central government to curtail costly services by ‘deflecting the blame 
down the hierarchy’ (Dear, 1981, quoted by Lemon in this volume). If the 
capital budgets of South African municipalities with huge infrastructure 
backlogs depend on their credit ratings in New York, for instance, the scope 
for local accountability to poor constituencies is limited. 
In comparing the poverty impact of ten decentralisation processes, 
Crook and Sverrisson (1999: 46) emphasise the politics of central-local 
relations: ‘[T]he most successful cases were the ones where central 
government not only had an ideological commitment to pro-poor policies, 
but was prepared to engage actively with local politics… to challenge local 
elite resistance if necessary and to ensure implementation.’ Mamdani’s 
analysis of the dislocation between urban and rural governance in South 
Africa leads him to a similar conclusion: In the absence of broader political 
alliances, ‘all decentralized systems of rule fragment the ruled and stabilize 
their rulers’ (1996: 300). 
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Restructuring the local state in such a way that it can play a role in 
transforming the economic relations which perpetuate inequality, then, may 
require a broader social struggle, dependent for its success on pro-poor 
political alliances locally, nationally and internationally. 
 
On Civil Society  
The South African struggle against apartheid was led by such an 
alliance, in the form of the United Democratic Front (UDF), which brought 
together blacks, coloureds, indians and whites through trade unions, civics, 
residents’ and squatters’ associations, rural women’s organisations, youth and 
student groups, stokvels, sports clubs, churches, mosques, temples and many 
other local, provincial and national organisations. A sanctions campaign 
developed together with anti-apartheid groupings around the world was also 
instrumental in forcing the South African state to yield. 
In the depoliticised conceptual categories of municipal 
developmentalism, these groups have become ‘civil society stakeholders’ to 
be treated on a par with large corporations or business associations. This 
conception partly reflects and partly explains the current weakness of such 
community formations. Civil society is cast in a western liberal-pluralist 
mould, wherein competition between local ‘interest groups’ on a ‘level playing 
field’ will ensure that power is dispersed and government is accountable 
(Dahl, 1961). This formulation, according to Ehrenberg (1999: 5) seeks to 
promote ‘stability in the interactions of the local, immediate and small’. Pro-
poor governance in South Africa, arguably, requires neither stability, nor the 
restriction of citizen action to short-term concerns at the local level. 
The white paper calls on municipalities to build local ‘social capital’ 
which it defines as the trust and open relationships between stakeholders 
required to generate a sense of common purpose. No attempt is made to 
specify exactly what kinds of social capital are likely to tip the balance of 
power in civil society in favour of the poor. The depoliticising effect of 
categories like civil society and social capital when imported into Africa by 
development agencies has been much critiqued (Mamdani, 1996, B. Fine, 
1998, Harrison in this volume) and Ehrenberg (1999: 5) reminds us that 
‘states and markets constitute civil society’ by shaping the political landscape 
within which civic norms are adopted and non-governmental groups form. 
Hence when ‘the social totality shaping civil society is a sphere of inequality 
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and conflict’, then ‘revitalizing civil society requires heightened levels of 
political struggle over state policy rather than [the] good manners and 
“civility”’ associated with social capital. 
South African business has been quick to engage in this political 
struggle by asserting its rightful place within civil society locally, nationally 
and internationally, and using this to build alliances in support of its agenda. 
At municipal level, business has called for a ‘multi-class growth coalition’ in 
support of a pro-growth agenda (CDE, 1998). Nationally, leading corporate 
CEOs have teamed up with influential religious leaders to launch the ‘South 
African Civil Society Initiative’. Internationally, South African business is also 
very active in lobbying for its interests in regional and international groupings 
such as the South African Development Community and the World 
Economic Forum. In all cases, business is using a civil society vantage point 
to exert influence on the state. 
Poor communities, and organisations representing marginalised 
groups, by contrast, have been less outspoken in calling on municipalities and 
the national state to construct cross-class coalitions to address poverty, 
although this might help create the political space required for pro-poor 
governance.  
Globalisation and localisation tend to lead to (at least the appearance 
of) a dispersion of political decision-making from the central state to a more 
polycentric arrangement (Chalmers, 1996). At the same time the particular 
interests of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised are fragmented as the 
search for competitiveness pits localities, ethnicities, genders and other 
identities against each other. Municipal developmentalism resolves this by 
offering everyone an equal place as a local stakeholder in developmental 
projects. But local equality is illusory, since some players have the economic 
power and spatial reach to ‘play beyond the local’ by influencing governance 
arrangements nationally and internationally and thus to manipulate the local 
‘terms of engagement’.  
Pursuit of pro-poor municipal governance will require ways to be 
found to address these imbalances within civil society through new political 
alliances amongst the poor and marginalised, aimed at restructuring the state. 
These will have to reflect the polycentrism of the state, the ease with which 
capital can restructure at a global scale, and the fragmentation of oppositional 
identities. Re-cohering the identities of the poor and marginalised will have to 
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transcend the individualization of ‘voters’ and ‘consumers’ or liberal-pluralist 
collective categories such as ‘stakeholder’. A conception of local citizenship 
will be required which invokes solidarity locally, nationally and internationally, 
linked to the power to hold state institutions accountable to the poor. And 
local state institutions, far from being autonomous operators in the market, 
will have to secure a more substantial share of national wealth for local 
people through alliances with higher-level state institutions. 
The particular forms such alliances might take in South Africa 
requires further investigation. Analysis from other regions undergoing 
economic and political transitions should be examined, such as the work on 
Latin America by Chalmers et al (1996) which identifies ‘associational 
networks’ as a new form of popular representation linking civil society to the 
state. Case studies of the implementation of municipal developmentalism in 
South Africa are beginning to emerge. The theoretical questions raised in this 
paper might be helpful in analysing these case studies, to examine the political 
and institutional form which successful pro-poor alliances are taking, or 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 For the full analysis see Cashdan, 1998a. 
2 Illegal reconnections may partly explain the low reconnection rate. 
3 The Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme received 49% of its budgeted 
R1.2bn for capital subsidies in 1998/9. Recurrent subsidies will drop by around 10% in 
real terms from 1.9% to 1.7% of national revenue after interest (RSA, 1998b: 25). 
4 In 1996/7 the Infrastructure Finance Corporation (INCA) lent R700m to municipalities 
at an interest premium of over 2%. 
5 Based on Bond, 1998. Stutterheim is well known for its peaceful political transition and 
the establishment of a local economic development programme. 
6 E.g. Johannesburg’s Interim Strategic Framework (1992-4). 
7 Two Brazilian cases illustrate pro-poor planning: the long-term commitment to 
environmentally friendly public transport in Curitiba and the popular participation in 
budgeting in Porto Allegre. 
8 Through price subsidies for water provided to commercial farmers and electricity to 
energy-intensive industries. 
9 The International Finance Corporation expects a 26-27% dollar rate of return on an 
investment in the Standard Bank South Africa Infrastructure Fund. 
10 In Odi in the former Boputhatswana, a partnership between the municipality and Rand 
Water Board is planned. In Cape Town, a redeployment of staff to repair leaking pipes is 
at the heart of a ‘worker turnaround’ (information from the South African Municipal 
Workers’ Union). Cutting out the slumlords in central Johannesburg has worked for the 
co-op housing residents who now pay rent to themselves. Where communities have 
helped design and build rural water supplies in return for equity, projects have been more 
successful. 
11 Goods whose enjoyment by one person does not preclude (and may actually result in) 
benefit to others, and for this or other reasons is not suited to individual billing. 
12 In the Community Water and Sanitation Supply programme of the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry, when villages have been provided with communal standpipes, 
people have broken into main supply pipes to connect pipes into their houses, leading to 
leakage. People have also refused to pay for the inferior communal service. 
13 Nelspruit’s chief executive cited finance (a 6% cap on the growth of municipal capital 
expenditure, and non-availability of public or private loans) as the factor behind a decision 
to privatise. Yet when private lenders were hesitant to finance a private concession, a 
public utility agreed (provisionally) to invest in the private project (Kotze, 1999: 643). 
14 E.g. People's Dialogue or Cape Town's Victoria Mxenge project 
15 Household income must be below R800 per month (RSA, 1998b). 
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16 Financial deregulation, advances in transport and communications, deindustrialisation, 
etc. For discussions of what is really new see Harvey, 1995, Arrighi & Silver, 1999. 
17 The failure of the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment  and the World Trade 
Organisation’s Millenial Round in Seattle was due to popular opposition to the domination 
of global trade and investment arrangements by corporate interests.  
18 The rand slipped from 5 to 6.3 to the dollar, and GDP fell for a few months at an 
annualised rate of -2%. Growth was 0.5% for 1998 (IDC, 1999). 
19 See Mayekiso (1996) for a traditional civic argument stressing community control and 
Swilling (1997) for a ‘new democratic African approach to urban management’. 
20 Interview with Hilary Armstrong, UK Minister for Local Government. 
21 Deconstruction of the political role of developmental discourses/practices are 
contained in Ferguson, 1990, Escobar, 1995. 
